Defining Religion

Starting at the beginning of this year (2015), we began a weekly discussion on definitions of religion. We identified a small set of journal articles on the definitions of religion for closer reading and critical reflection. Jonathan Z. Smith's 1998 article on the history of defining religion in the academic world brought up some interesting questions.

In this article, Smith set the framework for a familiar thesis shared by  critical scholars like David Chidester, Talal Asad and Tim Fitzgerald. They argue that religion is a category invented by scholars of religion searching for a non-theological, natural, anthropological approach. Smith concludes that this is a necessary even though flawed approach. In It is important to note that Chidester, Asad and Fitzgerald have argued that the study of religions as a non-theological exercise is shaped respectively by colonial frontiers, the history of Western intellectual history, and an ideological battle.

So our questions may asked pointedly:

• How should one proceed with definitions of religion? Do we really need a definition? What is the real value of such a definition?
• What do we do with the European legacy borne by colonial history?

Our discussion framed the following questions:

1. The history of defining religion as presented by Smith is not complete. In fact, it betrays a clearly Western intellectual history as argued by Talal Asad. More importantly, it completely ignores, for example, the history of defining dīn ('religion') in Islamic intellectual history. Can we safely ignore the history of dīn (plural adyān) as a theological exercise that can be ignored? What have the philosophers, poets and mystics said about dīn as a conceptual framework to understand human experience? Smith's history on defining religion is completely silent about this and other histories.

2. Smith presents an interesting journey of scholars and observers attempting to put forward a definition of religion that was gradually freed from its (Christian, European) theological roots. The journey began with a theological bias, but slowly replaced it with a rational, natural frame of reference. The essential feature of "religion" was propelled by a search first of a rational, then natural and now anthropological foundation. In these exercises, great insights about religion have been put forward. Given this history, we ask what is the value of reflections on religion by the religious (theologians, mystics, philosophers, sages)? is there nothing in this extended history of religions of mankind worthy of reflection? Has this western history of the study of religion erased the possibility that scholars of religion can learn anything about religion from the religious?

3. Another question emerged on the realization that the history of study of religion has emerged from the political and religious history of European modernization. This includes modern state formation, colonization, science and capitalist economics (among others). The very idea of religion as a distinct sphere can be related to this history. And the study of religion emerged from the identification of this sphere. How can one found a study of religion in other contexts, where these historical developments have followed a very different trajectory? Can one really do religious studies on the periphery? If so, how?

4. While a critical study of the study of religion is useful and enlightening, the challenge of studying religions remains? What should one look for? There is a strong feeling or consensus that religion cannot be separated from psychology, politics and society? How then should one study the religious dimension?

The Postcolonial condition for the Study of Religion

We hosted a highly successful meeting on the study of religion in post-colonial contexts in Cape Town, South Africa (March 2015). The meeting was attended by researchers from India, Pakistan, Portugal, the USA and South Africa. Altogether thirteen papers and positions were presented over two days in Cape Town. There was plenty of time for discussion on each paper, and enough time for discussion and debate during tea, coffee and meals.

At this our first meeting on thinking about religion education in a post-colonial context, the workshop was very successful. It raised crucial questions about the politics of post-coloniality and scholarship, the subject positions of researchers, and the terms that ought to be used in our intellectual work. Notable success was recorded around some issues for future collaboration and exhange.

Firstly, it was clear that much more needs to be done about intellectual exchange in the Global South. Sigificant progress may be mentioned in networks and associations like CODESRIA and the African Association for the Study of Religions (est. 1992). However, the weight of exchange had hardly tilted in favour of a true South-South exchange and collaboration. The meeting resolved to work for greater effort towards a true foundation of exchange, and the development of a critical mass of scholarship that would begin to address key issues facing scholars based in the global South.

There was a general realization that scholars working in the Global South had often one clear focus in common: their common dissatisfaction or unease with the North in one form or another. This dependency was often expressed in a great rejection of the North, making it our True North! This issue opened up a number of debates on the value of the canons produced. In our meeting in particular, the value of Emmanuel Kant became a bone of contention. There were some insightful suggestions of re-reading Kant and also reading against him, but also suggestions that a Foucaultian reading of Kant was liberatory. Others accused presenters of ignoring an African reading of Kant. All these were valuable points, but underlined the fact that a Global South Network often turned around the ills and opportunities of reading the Western canon. Surely, we concluded, we must be prepared to read and create new classics. We must read each other as critically as we read the European canon!

As far as the study of religion is concerned, there were a some specific suggestions and contributions. From my side, I want to close this short report with an observation. Scholarship on religion had made strides in the study of religion in post-colonial perspective. In particular, such scholarship had found the value of Marx (class and hegemony), Foucault (regimes of truth and genealogy, Bakhtin (theatre and play) and Homi Bhabha (hybridity). But is also interesting that most of the contributions on the religious experience of humankind emanating from the Global South has been bracketed as insider privileged musings. Would it not be a great idea to rethink the dichotomy of insder/outsider distinctions? Should such insights be rehabilitated as insights into the human condition, and not merely “religious” or “theological” positions that can be appraised by Western frameworks? Can we another look at Tutu or Ibn al-Arabi or Mencius as observers of human behaviour, rather than mere participants in the human journey?

Hamba Kahle Mandela

The former President of South Africa passed away, and has been rightly remembered in glowing terms. Nelson Mandela was loved not only because he led the nation and the world, but mainly because he touched individuals and communities in their deepest hopes, fears and dreams. When you look at his interaction with the Muslim commmunity in South Africa, for example, he acknowledged and recognized their contribution in the country, their global fears and concerns with the War on Terror, and their sense of belonging to South Africa. He offered a leadership model marked by a deep spirit of generosity, a quality rarely found in leaders.

Revisiting the Early Modern - Shakespeare from the South

An interesting discussion on the Southern tip of Africa reflected on the meaning of the early modern by critically examining the reception and remaking of Shakespeare. It was a stimulating presentation by three doyens of Shakespeare from UCT, U of Stellenbosch and Wits. They did not go on about the value of Shakespeare for English, the world and South Africa's existential challenges. They were fun, challenging and interesting.

But as someone who has recently discovered Nassim Nicholas Taleb and his thoughts on all kinds of things, I was wondering if the the absence of Shakespeare in South Africa should be our starting point. Despite its dominant role in the school syllabus, Shakespeare is generally ignore. I do not know if Shakespeare is read as regularly in schools as it was in my time, but Shakespeare seems to have disappeared from my life as soon as I matriculated. I sometimes felt a bit guilty that I did not know him as well as my erudite colleagues.

But the point is. Should we start our thinking about the (early) modern from a South African perspective about how Shakespeare is re-defined, re-created and re-cast. Should we rather not start with his absence among most South Africa, in spite of years of curriculum design.

Should Verse 34 of Chapter 4 of the Qur’an be banned? Religious Texts, Practices and the Constitution

The South African Human Rights Commission decided not to support a banning of a translation of the Qur’an which, according to a complaint lodged by Fazel Mohamed, promoted violence against women. Mr. Mohamed had found a translation of the Qur’an in a Johannesburg bookstore, and pointed to a portion of verse 4:34: “As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly).”

 Since 9/11, there have not been a shortage of individuals who have taken offence against one or another verse of the Qur’an, or of Islam in general. A pastor in Florida organized a ritual burning of the Qur’an on Network TV, while Geert Wilders in the Netherlands has built his political career on his promise to ban the Qur’an. Only this week, the details of a spoof on Islam and an apparently related attack on the US Ambassador in Libya are still unraveling. Fazel Mohamed has joined a rather motley group whose “mission” seems to be directed against some or the other symbols of Muslims.

It is difficult to make any serious comment on these events, other than pointing out that they are often childish and opportunistic attempts at gaining publicity, while playing out deep personal prejudices and conflicts. In our mediatized world, an attack on Islam is guaranteed to get you the attention of the media and an immediate reaction from Muslims.

However, Fazel Mohamed has tied his complaint closely to the prevalence of marital violence against women. This is a particularly endemic problem in South Africa, making the complaint less frivolous than it appears at first sight. While government and civic bodies attempt to eradicate the source of marital violence, the question of any religion’s complicity in promoting violence is a matter that deserves serious attention.

Prof. Pierre de Vos takes a view in support of Fazel Mohamed. He correctly lists a number of practices and views advocated by one or other religion in South Africa, which fundamentally contradict the values of the Constitution. Moreover, he suggests that the only reason why they are not proscribed is the support they enjoy from power lobby groups or powerful religions.

I think that the matter requires more careful reflection and consideration. Religious texts are complex, and religious practices should be debated in more sensitive ways. Both Prof. de Vos and Mr. Mohamed fail to appreciate the deeper and richer significance of religious practices in our societies, and their entanglement in a constitutional culture of South Africa.

All religious texts are part of a complex system of meanings and practices that go beyond one particular verse, or section thereof. There is a world of hermeneutics, but also rituals and dispositions that make up a world that is negotiated between the text and context, and past and present.

Over the last century, the verse has come under critical evaluation among Muslim communities. Its interpretation has come under the influence of modernization, a culture of equal rights, and in South Africa, the Constitution of 1996.

Under the influence of a new set of values, the verse has brought a certain level of discomfort among a large number of Muslims. Some of this discomfort was revealed when Muslims responded to Faizel Mohamed’s complaint. They tried to argue that the verse was not a blanket advocacy of violence; they said that it was not even violence when considering that one ought to use a tooth stick of piece of cloth; and they reminded Fazel Mohamed that this was a last resort in a desperate situation.

In their responses, Muslims exposed the limitation of interpreting the verse in the light of the values of the Constitution. They were not willing to admit the offending practice advocated by the verse. They hardly appreciated the patriarchal framework of the text. At the same time, however, they revealed their discomfort in a text that desperately called for interpretation in contemporary society. They demonstrated merely what happens when a text meets a new context.

Muslims in general are divided in their responses to texts like these. A minority believes that such verses should be interpreted in the light of new social values. The verse assumes patriarchy, but does not advocate it, they say. Strict literalists argue that the verse cannot be explained away, but then embark on social and political projects to reinforce or even bring back patriarchal values in society. Conservatives, who are in the majority, work around the verses and mitigate their evident excesses.

Ironically, both Pierre de Vos and Fazel Mohamed take a rather fundamentalist approach to the text. They seem to assume that religious texts are an accurate reflection of practices. Just like their fundamentalist counterparts, they seem to think that religious texts lead to only one set of meanings, and one set of acts. Fundamentalists demand a meticulous fidelity to these texts, while Pierre de Vos and Fazel Mohamed assume that they do.

Beyond these responses, moreover, the verse is part of a vast forest of texts and commentaries on marriage relations. This verse is a particular response of a husband towards the infidelity of his wife, and contrasts with another that deals with the infidelity of the husband. This verse is clearly patriarchal in tone and intent, but should be read with many more that emphasize which values (kindness, justice and fairness) a patriarch should cultivate. There is even a hadith that suggests that the Prophet Muhammad himself was not inclined to support the ‘right’ of a husband “to strike (lightly)”.

Then, one has to take into consideration the affective world around texts. Beyond the interpretive debates and social dispositions, texts form part of deeper rituals in society. In the case of the Qur’an, verses are not so much understood as they are heard, performed and experienced. For many Muslims, the full force of this section of the verse is only now becoming apparent in the public debate.

It is certainly true that some values advocated by religions, or practiced as such, are in conflict with the values of the Constitution. And this particular section of the verse in question, when acted upon literally, would constitute a violation of the dignity of a woman in a marital relation. And thus, such a practice (‘striking one’s wife (lightly)’) should be proscribed (which it is). But what about reciting such a verse, or reading its translation, or debating its interpretation?

Fazel Mohamed and Pierre de Vos are to be commended for raising the problem of religious texts and religious practices in our societies. However, they seem to ignore the deep engagement called for between the Constitution, a new set of values, and values and practices that have developed over time. Their questions generate more debate, but more often merely stifle debate, often the very debate that is going on in religious communities.

The Constitution of South Africa is a founding document that emphasizes equality, dignity and mutual respect.  These values overlap but are not identical with Islam, or with other cultural and religious groups. These values are clearly not embraced by each and every person in South African society. South Africans accept the constitution but they often carry on as if nothing has changed.

What is required is a full appreciation of the worlds of meaning and interpretation that face the constitutional challenge of South Africa. Any short-cuts close off this engagement, and threaten to replace one fundamentalism with another.