Saturday, July 4, 2020

Covid-19 and Religion: Cosmologies of Islam and Science (Part 1)


I recently received a WhatsApp message that claimed that Muslims are disproportionately represented in COVID-19 fatalities in two provinces in South Africa. I have not been able to establish its veracity, but I have heard there are a multiplicity of views among religious people on how to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such views are confusing for some, and I have been asked to offer my view on this. 
Since the lockdown in South Africa, I have been collecting statements on religious responses in South Africa. In this first part of this two-part blog, I would like to share this random collection of Muslim responses. This is far from exhaustive, but I have identified a familiar pattern that I can share. 


In this first blog, I will offer my usual approach to Muslim discourse. This is a method that I have used over the years, focusing closely on how Muslim discourse on an issue takes shape. Whether this is apartheid, democracy, or radicalization, a language game clearly emerges. The discourse is deeply contextual, but it is informed by a long history of religious values, practices and ethics. I might even say that there is one discourse that is easily understood and engaged with by its interlocutors. This discourse does not mean that there is one Islam, but neither does it suggest multiple Islams. At the same time, the discourse may be seen to confront or respond to new developments in religion, politics, values and technology. So, my approach lies in starting with the discourse and its response, rather than beginning with the new and working backwards.

The discourse on COVID-19 is marked by a sharp debate that is by definition unresolvable. Participants in the discourse make a claim to truth, some with more confidence and vehemence than others. But the discourse is fundamentally diverse, divisive and multiple. There is a beautiful Hadith that captures this feature: “The difference of opinion in my community is a sign of compassion.” Not all Muslims treat their opponents with compassion, but most accept this diversity in theory.

This discourse on COVID-19 includes discussion on the virus, its nature and history. It includes questions about how to respond to government regulations. Apart from the act of staying at home, the Muslim discourse turns specifically around how to pray and where? Each of these terms (virus, state and prayer) pivot the discourse in a different direction. Central questions and positions are shaped around them. They also show that older questions are addressed and reformulated.  

Religious leaders, through their organizations and mosques, say that the pandemic is the will of God, but they also advise Muslims to take the necessary precautions and to focus on their sinful behaviour. In particular, they accept that daily prayer should be performed at home. Regular attendance at mosques for men is a central practice in South Africa. This accommodation, especially for Friday prayers, shows the extent to which the religious scholars in South Africa have accepted the main pillar of the lockdown. There was one special appeal to President Ramaphosa to allow Muslims to celebrate the end of Ramadan. But it hardly received any support among Muslims. 

Closely tied to this assent is a general emphasis from these religious leaders to urge Muslims to turn to God in supplication (du’a) and increasing charity. The focus on supplication asks Muslims to repent for their sins, to develop a better relationship with God. The pandemic is seen as an opportunity for refocussing on personal piety, on deep introspection. 

Sometimes, when I think that a WhatsApp group is focussed exclusively on prayer and supplication, I notice a call for charity follows. Charity is extended to all. And it is also not so exclusively connected with the object of mission (daʿwa). Both these features have been central to charity. Charity in Islam is divided into kinds, some are exclusively set aside for Muslims. And charity is also seen as a way of extending the faith. I have not seen an emphasis on either in the various statements sent around social media during this time. Of course, these observations need to be tested with more data.

But there are smaller groups who argue that the general Muslim establishment has not recognized the full challenge of the pandemic. In an early statement, the former premier of the Western Cape pointed to the still insular and "survivalist" preoccupation of the Muslim response, and its rejection of scientific evidence. By focussing only on Muslims and denying the evidence of science, Ebrahim Rasool argued that Muslim responses seem very much like Trump. Islam, in his view, was rather a religion of mercy and science. Muslims should turn outwards, not inwards in this difficult time.

Others have followed these critical remarks with different nuances. The closure of mosques, according to some, has exposed the continued marginalization of women and the poor in the communities. When a group brought a court order to argue that going to a mosque was unconditional for Muslims, their views could not justify why women were systematically excluded in many mosques. Others have pointed to the deep inequalities that have been exposed by the virus, which is unacceptable to general Islamic norms and values. In this strand of the discourse, the virus offers an opportunity to revisit old values and paradigms of thinking and acting among Muslims.

But there is a strand in the discourse that has challenged all the other positions. It is represented by a group of religious scholars across the country who seem to want to establish themselves as the representatives of a "pristine" Islam. They seem to offer an alternative position to the "mainline" religious leadership, clearly wishing to replace them. They heap scorn on the closure of the mosques and the scientific analysis of the virus.

It also believes that the pandemic is the will of God. Based on a prophetic Hadith, however, it goes further that there is not such a thing as an infection. Also based on a hadith, Muslims should stay in one place during a pandemic. But there is no provision in the religious literature, it claims, for staying away from mosques, limiting the number of males attending, or keeping a social distance inside. It asks Muslims to stay away from mosques that keep to such regulations. It promises that the punishment of God will soon descend upon society, especially when the mosques are empty. Again, this is supported by a Prophetic hadith. 

When one ignores the incendiary language, this is a consistent argument. Interestingly, when we turn to what it shows (what a Muslim has to do), this statement supports staying away from mosques. It asks Muslims not to attend mosques which adhere to social distancing. Unexpectedly, but based on different reasoning, it complies with government regulations even while it fulminates against other Muslims. This compliance, of course, comes when Muslims are not compliant with its recommendations. So, it thrives on contradiction. 
   
But taking another look, this strand represents a worldview that focusses on the will of God, and several prophetic statements and juridical arguments on how to behave. Even though promoted by a minority, it forces other Muslims to respond to its views in one form or other. So the Islamic Medical Association's statement on the pandemic is that the will of God works "through an apparent cause and effect." Similarly, critical Muslims point to its lack of attention to the values of Islam. They point to its rejection of scientific evidence, and its lack of attention to the needs of the greater society.

The minority position plays thus an important role in the discourse, even though its main role seems to be a counter-point of what Muslims are really doing and thinking. Does this mean that this is the ideal Muslim position, against which real values and practices are negotiated? Scholars of religion would support this argument. For some like Jonathan Z. Smith, a ritual presents an ideal for society, but society flouts it. I do not agree with this model of ritual, but I will pick up this in my second blog. I do think though that what this group says cannot be avoided by most Muslims today. 

For now, I have hopefully shown that in the last few months, a discourse on COVID-19 has emerged among Muslims. This is a discourse shaped by Muslim actors across the board. I have used some social media exchanges to point to its main strands. There are dominant and marginal strands, but they form a debate on values and practices about the virus (science), the state (society and politics) and prayer (religion).  

I would conclude that the main questions are not resolvable. But they show us how religious responses engage the present crisis. The crisis cannot be left alone - it forces everyone to respond. What we see from the discourse is the attempt by some to gain a position against others. This conflict is endemic to religion, as it is to other spheres of life. Religion discourse points to existing views that dominate or that trouble society. These include the value and role of science, relations with a state, neighbours or the world. The discourse points to the value of others, particularly the most vulnerable and weak. And through its reflection on prayer, it also points to the individual's vulnerability at a deep and personal level.  The discourse shows that religious views are continually assailed by new developments.









Friday, June 26, 2020

Discourse and Ethics in Religious Traditions

It has been become an established tradition in our research project Islam, African Publics and Religious Values to read a number of books and articles in a weekly reading group. This semester (first half of 2020), we read the following: 

  • An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed. Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariʿa. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
  • Mittermaier, Amira. Giving to God: Islamic Charity in Revolutionary Times. Oakland, California: Univ of California Press, 2019.
  • Ware III, Rudolph T. The Walking Qur’an: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
  • Schielke, Samuli. “Hegemonic Encounters: Criticism of Saints-Day Festivals and the Formation of Modern Islam in Late 19th and Early 20th-Century Egypt.” Die Welt des Islams 47, no. 3 (2007): 319–55.
And we also dedicated some weeks to presentations from our group: 

Yasmin Ismail (PhD candidate) - Re-conceptualizing Madrasa education; notes from Cape Town
Dr Nadeem Mahomed  - The Elusive Ummah: Between the Political, Orthodoxy and Heresy
Dr Amy Stambach - Pragmatic faith and bulldozer ethics in the study of religious populism
Dr Anrea Cassatella - Beyond the Secular: Islam, Religion, and Democracy 


As is clear, this has been a very busy semester. Considering that the meetings were held during COVID, it was particularly remarkable.

We concluded our meeting with a review of these papers. And this is my general sense of the general questions that were raised during the semester:

    1. What are the political projects in which religious discourses are located or articulated? I am aware that I am forcing a distinction between religion and politics here. Nevertheless,  we reflected on the Mittermaier's study of giving in the context of the modern Egyptian state, Stambach on Tanzania from ujamaa socialism to neo-liberalism, Rudolph Ware on the politics of slave raiding in 18th Century Africa, An-Na’im on a secular state for Muslims, and Derrida on the modern secular state in Cassatella. So, it seems important to identify the nature of the state and more importantly of politics. Sometimes the state may remain implicit by choice. But as we learn from Derrida, we are all located in a particular political space.
    2. Then, when we were able to escape or suspend the impact of politics, we identified religious discourse in these states. This might or might not be a quest to escape from politics. In our readings, some of the studies focussed more on the state than others. But there was a religious discourse noticeable. I mean by this a language and practice associated with religion. Thus, Mittermaier’s Giving for God, Kweka’s development projects for the Church in Tanzania, Amin on Islamic education, Ware on the embodiment of the Quran, Nadeem’s on the quest for authenticity. Some have been more clear than others in identifying these as religious discourse, but I think we can ask more detailed questions on how these discourse work, what they expect from participants (practices). And how then are they related to (1). 
    3. Thirdly, we interrogated values in these religious discourses. So for Mittermaier, it was giving and sharing, Kweka in Stambach on critical engagement with state policy, and development for the Church, Yasmin on the imposition of a model of education or resistance, Ware on embodiment, but also resistance to modernization or accommodation with it, An-Naim and Nadeem on freedom and authenticity, and Derrida also freedom. Freedom and resistance seem central in some religious discourses, but we tried to look beyond this modernist shadow.

    All in all, an extremely productive and thoughtful semester. Thanks to all the participants. 

    I will be sharing more on this group, but particularly how I think we can use a discursive approach to a complex language game with a long history. 
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    Sunday, March 22, 2020

    The Knowledge of the Future? Unpredicatbilty and the Human Condition

    As the Coronavirus sweeps across the world, we are reminded of Nassim Taleb's prescient insight that Black Swans determine the course of human history. These Black Swans are by definition unpredictable, and it is futile to prepare for them. But they shape the course of history and force us to work with them.

    What I want to ask is the following? Is there an ethical value in this unpredictability?

    I am reminded of this condition by a verse in the Qur'an:
    Verily, with God alone rests the knowledge of when the Last Hour will come; and He [it is who] sends down rain; and He [alone] knows what is in the wombs: whereas no one knows what he will reap tomorrow, and no one knows in what land he will die. Verily, God [alone] is all-knowing, all-aware (Qur'an 31:34).
    Modern commentators have noticed that modern science has shaken this belief. They often do not say this, but God's future knowledge mentioned in this verse is not as opaque as it once was. We know much more about the rains, the wombs, and perhaps also what will happen tomorrow (through statistics and experimental science with repeated trials in a laboratory). Commentators of the Qur'an have been quick to suggest that the verse is not contradicted by such developments. For example, they say, weather forecasters cannot predict with certainty that rains will come. And on a personal level, we know that too well.  But is this enough?

    It seems to me that they are missing the point by focussing on the extent of human knowledge and not what kind of ethical act ought to follow from understanding this condition. Taleb's insight is more helpful in thinking about the human condition which is marked by unpredictability. In comparison with viruses and other natural disasters, humans often add to this unpredictability on a much higher scale. We know that a train can get us to work, but not that someone or some syndicate will steal cables. Or, we know that technology can be used to make life more comfortable, but humans are responsible for using technology to devise systems of government that keep the benefits for a few.

    And I can think of no better verse than the following that emphasizes human responsibility:
    Verily, We did offer the trust [amānah] to the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains: but they refused to bear it because they were afraid of it. Yet man took it up - for, verily, he has always been prone to be most wicked, most foolish (Qur'an 33:72).
    This verse presents a strong contrast between human and natural capacity and responsibility. Much has been written on amanah, most of it to emphasize obedience to the laws of God. But the word is derived from the room amn which means "security" and peace. And amanah is translated as a trust or responsibility.  And this has led some of the earliest commentators of the Qur'an to suggest that it refers to the human capacity to fulfill obligations in general. Fulfilling obligations promotes a level of guarantee that humans will do what is expected - meaning, what is right and good. Without this commitment, life can be even more precarious than we know it.

    The fulfillment of obligations is a responsibility that the mountains and heavens refused to accept.  And this is because they did not want to accept the burden that they would have responsibility for choosing to do good (fulfill obligations).  Many commentators seem to think that they were afraid of the wrath of God. But I think that if we keep our focus on the question of responsibility, then it means that only humans were willing to guarantee fulfilling their obligations. And it is this choice, exercised in a just and responsible way, that humans were prepared to take.

    Of course, most of the time human will fail to live to our own expectations - "prone to be most wicked, most foolish." But the beauty lies in our conviction that they can if they want to.

    The ultimate unpredictability of the future is part of the human condition, but humans have the responsibility to promote a world of trustworthiness. We cannot control the heavens and the earth, but we can and do all kinds of promises to each other. Written or unwritten, promises are the networks of relations that bind and make life stable and to some extent predictable.  Politicians promise to rule with justice and compassion, couples promise to love and support, and so forth. The predictability or unpredictability of such promises depends on humans. It is a grave responsibility, which the heavens and earth refused to accept. 

    Monday, November 4, 2019

    On the Mughal Empire

    On my current visit in the Indian Subcontinent, I decided to familiarize myself with the history of the region. One of the books that I have read is Abraham Eraly's The Mughal Throne (Phoenix House, 2014). It is a lengthy introduction to the Mughals from Babur to Aurengzeb.

    The first time I heard about the Mughals was in undergraduate class in Islamic Studies in South Africa. Just as in other dynasties, this one was clothed in a vision of a succession of amirs or sultans representing the power and glory of Islam. Since then, that reputation has been tarnished by a better understanding of history and reality and the battle over identity in modern public spheres.

    Eraly's narrative is a refreshing and detailed account of the Mughals. Like other modern Indians, he has a preference for Akbar and even more for the British who succeeded the Mughals. But generally, this is an almost dispassionate account of invasion, plunder, empire building and religion - in that order. The religious inspiration is not central in the narrative, but it is not tucked away either. When he comes to Aurangzeb, Eraly goes on about his excessive religious zeal. But he then follows with an account of the realpolitik of building an empire and keeping it under control.

    Even though Eraly concludes the book with a lament that the Mughuls did not build any institutions, he leaves us with fascinating details on administration, judicial practices and organization. Some of the Mughal rulers and officers seemed to have had the vision and the guts of building an empire that stretched across different territories and languages. And for the most part, they seem to consider it their right and responsibility to rule over this territory.

    And this is the part that I think inspired them for hundreds of years. These central Asian warriors entered history and changed it in a way that most can only dream about. It was not just a matter of religion, good or bad. Reading about this empire, like any political epic, gives one a sense of history and purpose.

    Of course, this right and responsibility often came at a price. Eraly occasionally turns away from the imperial record, to shine a light on the price paid for the Mughal empire by the peasants and workers. They worked hard and paid a lot simply for being spared. Very often, they found that joining the armies fighting each other offered better prospects than being plundered by them. Either be a plunderer or be plundered - seems the motto that occupied most of the people who lived in the shadow of the Mughal warrior Sultans.

    Surely, there was more going on in Mughal India than this, but Eraly is a great place to start.


    Wednesday, May 29, 2019

    On Nouman Ali Khan's YouTube Tafsir - ethics and self-reflection

    Like other special guests in recent years, Nouman Ali Khan attracted hundreds of worshipers to the grand Gatesville Mosque in 2019.  He seems to be part of a phenomenon in which middle-class mosques in recent years in Cape Town expended great effort and money to attract the biggest crowds. 

    Given his popularity and wanting to know more about his appeal, I decided to look for him on Youtube. I watched the first lesson that came up in my search. It was a discourse on the Prophet Dawud (David) from the 38th chapter in the Qur'an (Sad 38:17-25). 

    Khan presented a very clear and moving account of Dawud, his status as a prophet, and his reaction to a group of intruders who demanded that he judge between them. He began his talk with a short criticism of Muslim scholars who related this event to Biblical accounts. Muslims, he proclaimed, had a different and more correct version of the story which did not implicate the Prophet in impropriety.

    He then proceeded with an interpretation that emphasised the ethics of judging between two individuals. Overwhelmed by the rude intrusion of the complainants, the Prophet Dawud made a hasty decision. In the case in question, he only listened to the person who had one sheep and complained that his rich compatriot who had ninety-nine wanted his as well. The Prophet Dawuod “understood that We had tried him” (Qur'an) and according to Khan, corrected himself. Khan dwelt on the theme of making fair judgments, by listening to both sides of a story. In this interpretation, the man with 99 sheep was wronged by not being heard by the Prophet. 

    It was an impressive delivery, executed with great flair and conviction. I could begin to appreciate how thousands of followers turned to him for advice and guidance on social media.

    I decided to read a number of commentaries to see how he produced such a compelling account. On the one hand, I was impressed by how Khan had managed to wade through the complexity of the exegetical literature to produce a clear and simple message on Islam’s ascendancy over previous scriptures, and its message of justice. 

    On the other hand, this retelling was taking away an important and deep self-reflection embedded in the verses, and brought up by many commentators from al-Tabari in the 9th century onwards. Like Khan, most of these commentators also seemed to work with the doctrine that Dawood was a prophet of God who should not be accused of moral impropriety.

    But unlike Khan, most of them retold the Prophet Dawood's alleged attraction to a beautiful woman he had seen bathing. All commentators with the exception of Ibn Kathir mentioned this in one way or another. Many also mentioned that the Prophet had asked that her husband be sent at the head of battle until he was killed. And they say that the Prophet then married this woman. One commentator offered a lexical analysis of the word for sheep (na’ja) and suggested it could also refer to a woman or wife, thus pointing to a direct relationship between the verses of the Qur’an and its Biblical version. 

    In the exegetical (tafsir) tradition, then, this event or versions thereof was told just enough to allude to the Biblical story.  While skirting directly the implication of the Prophet’s deeds, an impropriety was implied. 

    But most of all, premodern commentators insisted that this was a story of temptation with which the Prophet Dawud was tested. They did not say he failed, but they emphasised the fact that he realised his temptation. Their meditations turned around the very verse that Khan asked his audience to skip: "And [suddenly] Dawood understood that We had tried him: and so he asked his Sustainer to forgive him his sin, and fell down in prostration, and turned unto Him in repentance." (Quran 38:24).  This is a prostration (sajda) verse which, when heard or read, requires an immediate prostration. The prostration was a ritualised embodiment of reading and listening to a particular verse. In the story of the Prophet Dawud, it embodied his realisation that he was being tested (fatannahu)

    Nouman Ali Khan offered an attractive message on ethics and justice. Prefaced with the conviction that Islam was better than other religions, he confirmed an unquestioned truth and guided his listeners towards ethical virtue.

    But he avoided an uncomfortable truth in this exposition. In this particular case, the ethic of justice without deep introspection seems to truncate the message of the Prophet Dawud. Preaching about justice without a prostration misses an important method of the Qur’an. 

    But Khan did demonstrate an uncomfortable truth of modern Islamic discourse. Many modern middle-class Muslims like to listen to lectures on the superiority of Islam over other religions. And they accompany this with the conviction that they ought to be just to merit this distinction. Of course, it helps to know that they can keep their "99 sheep." But they often stop short of taking that additional step into the self, the step exemplified in Prophet Dawud’s prostration. 

    While scholars of religion and media stress the importance of mediation, they too often ignore the ethical choices and constructions made in the process. There may be considerable value in following this line of research more extensively than what I have shown in this brief review.