The South African Human Rights Commission decided not to support a banning of a translation of the Qur’an which, according to a complaint lodged by Fazel Mohamed, promoted violence against women. Mr. Mohamed had found a translation of the Qur’an in a Johannesburg bookstore, and pointed to a portion of verse 4:34: “As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly).”
Since 9/11, there have not been a shortage of individuals who have taken offence against one or another verse of the Qur’an, or of Islam in general. A pastor in Florida organized a ritual burning of the Qur’an on Network TV, while Geert Wilders in the Netherlands has built his political career on his promise to ban the Qur’an. Only this week, the details of a spoof on Islam and an apparently related attack on the US Ambassador in Libya are still unraveling. Fazel Mohamed has joined a rather motley group whose “mission” seems to be directed against some or the other symbols of Muslims.
It is difficult to make any serious comment on these events, other than pointing out that they are often childish and opportunistic attempts at gaining publicity, while playing out deep personal prejudices and conflicts. In our mediatized world, an attack on Islam is guaranteed to get you the attention of the media and an immediate reaction from Muslims.
However, Fazel Mohamed has tied his complaint closely to the prevalence of marital violence against women. This is a particularly endemic problem in South Africa, making the complaint less frivolous than it appears at first sight. While government and civic bodies attempt to eradicate the source of marital violence, the question of any religion’s complicity in promoting violence is a matter that deserves serious attention.
Prof. Pierre de Vos takes a view in support of Fazel Mohamed. He correctly lists a number of practices and views advocated by one or other religion in South Africa, which fundamentally contradict the values of the Constitution. Moreover, he suggests that the only reason why they are not proscribed is the support they enjoy from power lobby groups or powerful religions.
I think that the matter requires more careful reflection and consideration. Religious texts are complex, and religious practices should be debated in more sensitive ways. Both Prof. de Vos and Mr. Mohamed fail to appreciate the deeper and richer significance of religious practices in our societies, and their entanglement in a constitutional culture of South Africa.
All religious texts are part of a complex system of meanings and practices that go beyond one particular verse, or section thereof. There is a world of hermeneutics, but also rituals and dispositions that make up a world that is negotiated between the text and context, and past and present.
Over the last century, the verse has come under critical evaluation among Muslim communities. Its interpretation has come under the influence of modernization, a culture of equal rights, and in South Africa, the Constitution of 1996.
Under the influence of a new set of values, the verse has brought a certain level of discomfort among a large number of Muslims. Some of this discomfort was revealed when Muslims responded to Faizel Mohamed’s complaint. They tried to argue that the verse was not a blanket advocacy of violence; they said that it was not even violence when considering that one ought to use a tooth stick of piece of cloth; and they reminded Fazel Mohamed that this was a last resort in a desperate situation.
In their responses, Muslims exposed the limitation of interpreting the verse in the light of the values of the Constitution. They were not willing to admit the offending practice advocated by the verse. They hardly appreciated the patriarchal framework of the text. At the same time, however, they revealed their discomfort in a text that desperately called for interpretation in contemporary society. They demonstrated merely what happens when a text meets a new context.
Muslims in general are divided in their responses to texts like these. A minority believes that such verses should be interpreted in the light of new social values. The verse assumes patriarchy, but does not advocate it, they say. Strict literalists argue that the verse cannot be explained away, but then embark on social and political projects to reinforce or even bring back patriarchal values in society. Conservatives, who are in the majority, work around the verses and mitigate their evident excesses.
Ironically, both Pierre de Vos and Fazel Mohamed take a rather fundamentalist approach to the text. They seem to assume that religious texts are an accurate reflection of practices. Just like their fundamentalist counterparts, they seem to think that religious texts lead to only one set of meanings, and one set of acts. Fundamentalists demand a meticulous fidelity to these texts, while Pierre de Vos and Fazel Mohamed assume that they do.
Beyond these responses, moreover, the verse is part of a vast forest of texts and commentaries on marriage relations. This verse is a particular response of a husband towards the infidelity of his wife, and contrasts with another that deals with the infidelity of the husband. This verse is clearly patriarchal in tone and intent, but should be read with many more that emphasize which values (kindness, justice and fairness) a patriarch should cultivate. There is even a hadith that suggests that the Prophet Muhammad himself was not inclined to support the ‘right’ of a husband “to strike (lightly)”.
Then, one has to take into consideration the affective world around texts. Beyond the interpretive debates and social dispositions, texts form part of deeper rituals in society. In the case of the Qur’an, verses are not so much understood as they are heard, performed and experienced. For many Muslims, the full force of this section of the verse is only now becoming apparent in the public debate.
It is certainly true that some values advocated by religions, or practiced as such, are in conflict with the values of the Constitution. And this particular section of the verse in question, when acted upon literally, would constitute a violation of the dignity of a woman in a marital relation. And thus, such a practice (‘striking one’s wife (lightly)’) should be proscribed (which it is). But what about reciting such a verse, or reading its translation, or debating its interpretation?
Fazel Mohamed and Pierre de Vos are to be commended for raising the problem of religious texts and religious practices in our societies. However, they seem to ignore the deep engagement called for between the Constitution, a new set of values, and values and practices that have developed over time. Their questions generate more debate, but more often merely stifle debate, often the very debate that is going on in religious communities.
The Constitution of South Africa is a founding document that emphasizes equality, dignity and mutual respect. These values overlap but are not identical with Islam, or with other cultural and religious groups. These values are clearly not embraced by each and every person in South African society. South Africans accept the constitution but they often carry on as if nothing has changed.
What is required is a full appreciation of the worlds of meaning and interpretation that face the constitutional challenge of South Africa. Any short-cuts close off this engagement, and threaten to replace one fundamentalism with another.
