Defining Religion

Starting at the beginning of this year (2015), we began a weekly discussion on definitions of religion. We identified a small set of journal articles on the definitions of religion for closer reading and critical reflection. Jonathan Z. Smith's 1998 article on the history of defining religion in the academic world brought up some interesting questions.

In this article, Smith set the framework for a familiar thesis shared by  critical scholars like David Chidester, Talal Asad and Tim Fitzgerald. They argue that religion is a category invented by scholars of religion searching for a non-theological, natural, anthropological approach. Smith concludes that this is a necessary even though flawed approach. In It is important to note that Chidester, Asad and Fitzgerald have argued that the study of religions as a non-theological exercise is shaped respectively by colonial frontiers, the history of Western intellectual history, and an ideological battle.

So our questions may asked pointedly:

• How should one proceed with definitions of religion? Do we really need a definition? What is the real value of such a definition?
• What do we do with the European legacy borne by colonial history?

Our discussion framed the following questions:

1. The history of defining religion as presented by Smith is not complete. In fact, it betrays a clearly Western intellectual history as argued by Talal Asad. More importantly, it completely ignores, for example, the history of defining dīn ('religion') in Islamic intellectual history. Can we safely ignore the history of dīn (plural adyān) as a theological exercise that can be ignored? What have the philosophers, poets and mystics said about dīn as a conceptual framework to understand human experience? Smith's history on defining religion is completely silent about this and other histories.

2. Smith presents an interesting journey of scholars and observers attempting to put forward a definition of religion that was gradually freed from its (Christian, European) theological roots. The journey began with a theological bias, but slowly replaced it with a rational, natural frame of reference. The essential feature of "religion" was propelled by a search first of a rational, then natural and now anthropological foundation. In these exercises, great insights about religion have been put forward. Given this history, we ask what is the value of reflections on religion by the religious (theologians, mystics, philosophers, sages)? is there nothing in this extended history of religions of mankind worthy of reflection? Has this western history of the study of religion erased the possibility that scholars of religion can learn anything about religion from the religious?

3. Another question emerged on the realization that the history of study of religion has emerged from the political and religious history of European modernization. This includes modern state formation, colonization, science and capitalist economics (among others). The very idea of religion as a distinct sphere can be related to this history. And the study of religion emerged from the identification of this sphere. How can one found a study of religion in other contexts, where these historical developments have followed a very different trajectory? Can one really do religious studies on the periphery? If so, how?

4. While a critical study of the study of religion is useful and enlightening, the challenge of studying religions remains? What should one look for? There is a strong feeling or consensus that religion cannot be separated from psychology, politics and society? How then should one study the religious dimension?